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Abstract 
In 2007, following a series of sector transformations and wanting to be up to speed 
on industry best practices, ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, SA, the Portuguese 
airports manager, adopts an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) model. In 2009, 
with a challenging new regulatory model in sight and the idea of an imminent 
privatization, the company reassesses and restructures the model. This case study 
follows this transition process, the implementation of the new ERM model and the 
intricacies brought by the new regulatory model.   
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“The pessimist complains about the wind 
 the optimist expects it to change 
the realist adjusts the sails.” 
 
William Arthur Ward 
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This Work Project is the result of the work developed within an internship 
program at ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, SA, the Portuguese airports manager.  
The internship was to be developed at the Risk Management Office within the 
Finance Division, working directly with the Risk Coordinator. This internship 
emerges at a time where ANA had completely redesigned its risk management 
approach and governance model and was then commencing its implementation 
process. To this very purpose, the main objectives for the intern were: to develop 
the methodologies to quantify six risks that were identified as priority; to adapt 
and optimize the respective quantification tools; to analyze the key risk indicators 
(KRIs) associated to each of the priority risks; to benchmark the adopted risk 
management approach to those used in some comparative airports; and finally to 
support the internal communication plan as a way to create a risk culture within 
the company. 
This Work Project, through the use of a case study, aims at covering the main, and 
arguably the most interesting, aspects of ANA´s risk management approach as well 
as attempts to provide a critical analysis of these topics using a discussion note. 
Case Narrative 
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Introduction 
At the end of 2009, ANA approves and begins to implement a new Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) model, after a first approach taken in 2007 had proved to be 
ineffective. Operating in an industry marked by intense transformations in the 
previous years, with a new regulatory model on the way bringing new challenges 
to the company and having an imminent privatization in mind, adopting an ERM 
approach seemed to the Board like a necessary step. But was this step merely a 
show-off, a looks good on paper ERM model to impress the financial markets, or 
was this new model capable of structurally change the way the company faced risk 
and ultimately shape top management decisions?   
ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, SA  
In 1998, ANA – Aeroportos e Navegação Aérea, EP (public company) splits in two 
different companies: NAV, EP which was to be focused exclusively on aerial 
navigation and ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, SA, to be responsible for the 
management of the Portuguese airport infrastructures at Lisbon, Oporto, Faro as 
well as at the autonomous region of Azores (Ponta Delgada, Santa Maria, Horta e 
Flores). ANA was owned by the Portuguese State both through the country’s 
treasury and finance department (Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças) which 
detained a 31,44% participation, and through a state holding – Parpública, 
detaining the remaining 68,56%.  
ANA’s activity was to comprise both the aviation and non-aviation business areas 
on top of the airport security and reduced mobility passengers (PMR)’s services. 
The aviation business was regulated and consisted of managing the necessary 
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infrastructures to the traffic of aircrafts, passengers and cargo. The non-aviation 
business, unregulated, concerned the management of airport’s commercial and 
advertising areas, real estate, parking lots and rent-a-car stations. The security and 
PMR components were object of autonomous regulation and were self-financed. 
The Company’s History 
From the original company, ANA inherits a simpler and more efficient 
organizational structure and a more decentralized management with more 
decision capability at the various business areas, namely the airports, the 
commercial activities and the infrastructures projects and studies area, as the 
result of a vast restructure imposed by an eventful decade. Indeed, the 90s began 
with an oil crisis, followed by some political instability along with the USA’s 
economic slowdown. These circumstances meant to ANA the very end of a self-
financed investments cycle, forcing it to resort to credit to support its development 
- a huge turning point for the company. Moreover, the European market was 
profoundly liberalized and both monopolies and tariff controls were ended, 
measures that brought upon big challenges that ANA faced by rethinking its 
positioning, thus then reorienting the company towards a more competitive focus, 
electing Client and Efficiency as the key-words to orient future company growth. 
As so, when ANA – Aeroportos de Portugal, SA borns, had already very clearly 
defined objectives: optimize resources, improve productivity, create more and 
better infrastructures and to advance the success of airport marketing. 
By the end of the decade, ANA had proven itself in the business, both in the country 
and beyond borders, and, as a result, Macau and Madeira’s airports were then 
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intrusting the company with its management. And so, ANA grew as a group, 
detaining a 70% participation in ANAM, the company managing the airports of 
Funchal and Porto Santo at the autonomous region of Madeira and a 49% 
participation in ADA, the company managing Macau’s airport. In a strategic vision 
that defined ANA as a reference group in the airports’ services, the group further 
integrated Portway – Handling de Portugal, SA (100%) and Naer (84,41%),  the 
company established in 1998 to develop the projects necessary for the preparation 
and execution of those decisions to be taken in the process of planning and 
launching a new airport on the Portuguese mainland.  
The construction of a new airport had been decided by the Government not only to 
respond to the imminent Portela’s saturation, but also to endow the country with 
an Atlantic hub to then connect to Europe. In 2000 its model was set to be a 
partnership between the public and private sectors, and this was to be articulated 
with the privatization of ANA itself. In the meantime, Portela followed its 
expansion plan as to achieve its utmost capacity, Sá Carneiro airport prevailed its 
own development plan, aiming at serving the entire Iberian Northeast and Faro’s 
airport proceeded with its remodeling, aspiring to become the best touristic 
airport of the Peninsula. 
All these plans were seriously delayed by 9/11. The economic and aviation crisis 
took its toll in returns, aggravated by the steep increase in security costs. This 
ultimately led to the suspension by the Government in 2004 of the new airport 
project, which magnified the importance of Portela’s plan. Furthermore, this 
context overstated the relevance of adopting a lighter and less expensive structure, 
capable of sharing resources and procedures among the entire group. This 
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restructure, between 2002 and 2004, was a step further in creating the 
indispensable conditions to the company’s privatization. In 2004 ANA’s traffic 
recovered its upward trend, not only due to external macroeconomic factors, such 
as the Euro 2004, but also due to a successful commercial strategy with flexible 
prices and incentives that were able to attract new airline companies, most notably 
low cost companies, which have played a key role in the company’s growth. 
A First Approach 
The airport sector had undoubtly suffered massive transformations in the previous 
years that contributed decisively to amplify its risk exposure. The ever growing 
importance of low cost airline companies, the traffic shocks (9/11, rising oil prices, 
etc.) and even the tendency, particularly in Europe, for the industry to exit the 
public sector, were some of the engines for the observed changes. ANA, just like the 
sector that comprises it, had been experiencing profound transformations. These 
changes, along with ANA’s constant concern with keeping up with industry’s best 
practices as well as having an imminent privatization in mind and recognizing the 
added value financial markets attribute to a systematic risk management, led the 
company to define and approve in 2007 a model to manage the risk inherent to its 
activity. 
This ERM model was based on a new governance structure that would supervise 
the implementation of the risk management procedures and communication plan 
(Exhibit 1). The latter served the purpose of developing a risk culture within the 
company as well as communicating ANA’s awareness of its risks and its proactive 
approach in dealing with them, along with the actual model.  
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This governance structure was comprised by a Risk Function, to be responsible for 
the global management of the model, and by four Subcommittees to be responsible 
for the supervision of the risk management procedures implementation and for the 
monitoring of the KPIs (Exhibit 2). The Subcommittees were formed by several 
elements, all with their own functions and responsibilities, and were each 
dedicated to a different risk (Exhibit 3). These risks (planning and strategic 
execution, regulatory, planning and operational coordination, corporate) were 
broad in nature in an attempt for the sum of the four to be exhaustive in covering 
the company’s risk map. 
Although the risks were identified and a global mapping was made, a governance 
structure was set and functions and responsibilities were attributed, a risk 
management cycle was defined and the programs and risk management policies 
were placed for each Subcommittee, and even though some initiatives were 
accomplished in all Subcommittees, such as the contingency plan, the large projects 
execution plan, the disaster recovery plan and the rules for financial instruments 
contracts, by 2009 ANA realized most of the model’s goals had not been met, its 
abandonment was growing and its implementation process was stagnated. 
Subsequently, the company proceeded to reassess the model as to diagnose what 
had gone wrong. By doing so ANA concluded that the model was not successful due 
to a combination of different factors, most notoriously, the goals set for the model 
were too ambitious for the moment ANA was living, the governance structure 
proved to be excessively complex and flawed in the choice of key elements and the 
model was not able to create a risk agenda throughout the company that could 
promote the involvement of all divisions. 
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Indeed, the company saw its ambition reflected in the large number of KRIs to be 
regularly monitored (25) and of procedures to be implemented (28) and the 
inability to prioritize them, particularly in a time when ANA had other priority 
projects in process, namely projects with greater visibility within the organization 
and with visible immediate results. So, the Subcommittees were having great 
difficulties in motivating people to dedicate their time to risk management and 
were even having problems in coordinating themselves and their busy schedules 
and as a result the agreed timings were being more and more neglected. This 
problem was intrinsically connected to the overly intricate governance structure. 
In fact, the large number of divisions involved in the management of the model was 
creating difficulties in the decision process and the great number of elements in 
each Subcommittee was making the schedules coordination very difficult. 
Furthermore, people felt that a person to be the top responsible for the success of 
the entire model was lacking and the absence of a focal point in risk management 
in each division was definitely hindering the management of the model. Finally, the 
company realized the low priority risk management had in the organization as a 
whole reflected in the small value attributed to the model itself and the documents 
produced and the reduced motivation to work for risk management.  These were 
aspects the company thought denoted the low proactivity of the Risk Function and 
its difficulty in mobilizing the organization, along with the importance of the never 
implemented communication plan in addition to a lack of intervention and 
empowerment of the Board members. 
Having identified the main factors preventing the success of a risk management 
initiative at ANA, the company proceeded to recognize the steps to relaunch the 
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model. First and foremost, the company realized the imperative of simplifying the 
governance structure, giving it a more efficient use of the company’s resources and 
centralizing efforts vs. decentralizing responsibilities, strengthening leadership by 
creating a Risk Coordinator, and intensifying resources allocated to the Risk 
Function. Furthermore, the risk map should be updated and priority risks ought to 
be identified and the same for the KRIs, by spotting those with greater impact and 
less implementation hardship. Moreover, there should be a development of more 
systematic tools and methodologies to quantify risks. And finally, risk performance 
had to be on directors’ agendas and the communication plan had to be 
implemented. 
The New Risk Management Model 
Taking all lessons learned from the previous model experience into account, a new 
ERM model arose. The governance model was heavily restructured and simplified 
and responsibilities were clearly defined. As a result, the risk control was then 
concentrated in the Risk Management Office (RMO), a team composed of two 
elements: the Risk Coordinator, with total responsibility over the risk management 
control within the company, and the Risk Analyst, responsible for the execution of 
priority risks control procedures. The previous model’s Subcommittees were 
concentrated on a single organ (Risk Committee) comprised of top management 
elements responsible for: analyzing the results from the control completed by the 
risk team; recommending mitigation measures; and selecting topics on risk 
management to be taken to the Board for approval (Exhibit 4). Finally, more 
responsibility was attributed to the various business units in the mitigation of 
existent risks, by implementing the measures set by the Risk Committee and the 
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Board. To better understand and clarify timelines and responsibilities across the 
organization in this process, a risk management cycle was established (Exhibit 5).  
As for the risk management procedures the focus was on prioritizing and 
systematizing. As a result, priority risks were to be established and their control 
was now the focus of the RMO. Tools and methodologies for the quantification of 
these risks were developed and were to be improved in a systematic fashion. 
Moreover, some basic (to be adapted and improved) templates were developed to 
facilitate the communication of risk control and its main conclusions and 
recommendations within the RMO to the Risk Committee. 
Priority Risks 
By the end of 2009, after careful assessment of an updated mapping (Exhibit 6) of 
all ANA’s risk exposures (a procedure that should be done annually, as observed in 
the risk management cycle) and using the potential impact on ANA’s business as 
rationale, six priority risks were identified: 
Business Risk: relating to the unexpected variation on the drivers of both 
revenues and costs. 
Credit Risk: associated with the failure of clients to comply with their debt. 
Financial Risk: relating to the unexpected increase in the cost of debt, originated 
by an increase in the reference rate (Euribor) or to an increase in the spread, and 
the shortage of liquidity to guarantee the financial management of the company in 
the short-term. 
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Large Investments Risk: concerning the failure to comply with the planned 
timing and budget to the execution of large investments within the company. 
Disruptive Events Risk: associated to events whose materialization would have a 
huge impact on the company’s demand (TGV, mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies, 
airport dependency on a single airline, etc.). 
New Regulatory Model Risk: associated to the change in the model that sets 
airport charges, a consequence of the economic regulation1 approved on 
September 4th, 2009, which brought ANA the impossibility to reflect in the prices 
the demand and costs variations as well as unexpected  investments or their extra 
costs. 
The procedures for the control of these priority risks, main KRIs and the used 
comparative values can be found on Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 respectively. 
Furthermore, some of the results for the quantifications made for the six risks for 
the year 2009, taken from the first report made by the new RMO, that functioned a 
bit like a test-drive for the tools and methodologies, but served the important 
purpose of providing a first feeling for these numbers at ANA, can be found on 
Exhibits 10 to 15. 
The New Regulatory Model 
ANA, as a utility and an obvious natural monopoly, was a heavily regulated 
organization. Still, as a completely state-owned company, its regulation allowed for 
a lot of flexibility and every year tariffs were calmly negotiated, absolutely 
respecting all regulation and always with the public interest in mind, but still set to 
                                                          
1 Decreto-Lei n.º 216/2009 in Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 172 — September 4, 2009 
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guarantee the company’s welfare and to cover most of the company’s losses and 
downfalls, thus eliminating most risks, or at the very least, strongly attenuating 
their impact. 
In 2009, following the guidelines of the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO)2 and European Union directives3 (that had to be incorporated in member-
states’ regulation by March 15, 2011), and having in mind an imminent 
privatization and the subsequent need for much stricter and transparent 
regulation, a new regulatory model arises and is approved later in that year on 
September 4th. 
The model at a glance: 
Price Cap: a maximum average return per passenger in the set of regulated 
activities (comprised by the air traffic activities, the only ones that actually 
constitute the utility and a natural monopoly) is established (Exhibit 16 and 17). 
Single Till: commercial activities’ returns contribute to finance regulated tariffs. 
This should evolve to Adjusted Single Till: as activities outside the terminal and 
not directly related to airport operations arise (hotels, business centers, retail 
parks, etc.), a reality particularly true in the case of the new airport (Exhibit 18). 
Service Quality Evaluation: the regulator authority establishes service levels and 
indicators; financial penalties applied affecting regulated returns otherwise. 
                                                          
2
 ICAO´s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, Doc 9082/7, 7th Edition, 2004 
3
 Directive 2009/12/CE, March 11, 2009 
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Operational Costs: the regulator may set efficiency levels to be achieved. 
Commercial Returns: the regulator may present evidences to demand a 
performance improvement.  
Investments: the regulator authority may not consider future investments, 
planned by ANA, if it considers them to be inefficient or unnecessary; it may not 
consider investments already completed by ANA, if it justifiably proves they could 
have been done in a more efficient manner; it may also not consider completed 
investments that were not part of the initial investment plan or that, if part taken 
on the plan, were completed with a cost significantly higher than planned.    
Regulatory Periods: 5 years; the first was an adapting 2-year period (2010-2011) 
The Future 
2010 began and ANA was less than two years away from a fully implemented and 
functioning new regulatory model. Major changes were demanded within the 
company and the word risk gained a whole new meaning to this organization used 
to incorporate each realized vs. planned difference and every downfall in the 
following year returns. Was the company ready? Was it taking the right steps to 
prepare itself? The idea, restructuring and implementation of the ERM model was 
undoubtly a step in the right direction, but was it enough? Was this new approach 
equipped to succeed where the first one had failed? Was the new RMO, together 
with the Risk Committee, be able to create the organizational risk culture 
indispensable to deal with the new challenges presented? 
Discussion Topics 
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 Discuss the main aspects of the new risk management practices at ANA. 
 
 What were the main novelties brought by the new regulatory model and what 
were the implications/risks that came along with it? 
 
 What are the main challenges ahead for ANA’s ERM approach? 
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Exhibit 1 Communication Plan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 Governance Structure and Responsibilities 
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Exhibit 3 Subcommittees and Covered Risks 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 4 New Governance Structure and Responsibilities 
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Exhibit 5 Risk Management Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6 Map of ANA’s risk exposures 
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Exhibit 7 Risk management procedures, periodicity and ability to manage each of the 
priority risks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 8 Key Risk Indicators to be used by the Risk Team 
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Exhibit 9 Values to compare with ANA’s figures for each KRI 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 10 ANA’s EBITDA@risk and volatility contribution of the most volatile drivers 
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Exhibit 11 Evaluating the impact of a scenario where EURIBOR and/or the spread of debt 
planned to be contracted in that year would be a 1pp higher than planned.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 12 Faro airport’s expansion plan – maximum cost and length evaluated at 80% 
probability and the impact of a scenario with both these maximum values on the project’s NPV.  
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Exhibit 13 Impact of 4 different disruptive events on ANA’s 2009 EBITDA 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 14 Real vs. forecast evolution and how this would affect ANA if in a regulatory 
period 
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Exhibit 15 4 different scenarios and how this was to affect ANA in a regulatory period 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 16 Price Cap vs. Rate of Return 
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Exhibit 17 Formula to compute the Price Cap at ANA, for each regulatory period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 18 How the Till works 
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Main aspects of the new risk management practices 
Ana was indeed able to learn from the previous experience and correct some of the 
main flaws of the previous ERM model. The new model had now a much simpler 
structure with a fully dedicated RMO, focused on the company’s priority risks. Still, 
a step further should be taken, as a simple governance best practice, to make the 
RMO a fully independent body, reporting directly to the Risk Committee, not 
having to report first to the Finance Division, namely to its director. 
Although the model is generally well worked out in terms of procedures and KRIs, 
some of the correspondent comparative values seem a bit random. For instance, 
looking at the disruptive events, should an assumption be made that an event with 
an impact inferior to 5€M should be disregarded? Is the company not worried with 
Easyjet leaving Faro’s airport (4,7€M impact)? Shouldn’t this information still be 
incorporated strategically for negotiation power if the situation is presented? What 
about future impact?  
As for credit, is it really relevant to raise a yellow flag if some client with a tiny 
office in one of ANA’s buildings has not paid his rent on time? Here it would be 
important for the RMO to focus on the top 10/20 clients and possibly the top 10 
infractions each month and leave the rest to be controlled at a operational level 
providing it with a proper systematized action plan (setting up relevant, most 
likely seasonal, credit limits that if surpassed would have an immediate response), 
so that top management does not need to meet and discuss a response for each 
credit infringement.  
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The most random seems to be the EBITDA@Risk; why 12% and 15%? Posterior 
computation shows ANA’s V@R at 13,59% in 2009 and even higher at 14,10% for 
2010. Is this a worrisome figure? Should a yellow flag be raised? In an attempt to 
grasp this number, it would be interesting to benchmark ANA’s peer group4: 
Copenhagen Schiphol Wien Zurich  ANA 
7,62% 13,52% 8,87% 6,68%  13,59% 
It is possible to observe that Schiphol’s figure is quite similar while the others 
present as substantially (approximately half) lower. Further research should be 
done to understand these differences. Is this risk level intrinsic to the company’s 
activities that are somehow more similar to Schiphol’s. Can this risk be reduced? 
Does ANA want to reduce it? 
The New Regulatory Model 
The Price Cap aspect of this model brought upon some risks that accrue to the 
embedded in the model risks of not accomplishing the efficiency and 
performance demanded by the regulator on operational costs and commercial 
returns respectively. Observing its computation formula it can be seen that ANA is 
to absorb all traffic volume risk as the Price Cap is set for a certain volume that if 
not achieved might represent a loss for the company. On the other hand, if 
overcame might constitute a gain that the company gets to keep. Furthermore, it 
introduced the risk of underestimating operational costs as well as the risk of 
overestimating commercial returns.  
                                                          
4 Computation made using 5 years of data (the same as ANA) collected from Annual Reports and from ACI 
(Airports Council International). 
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The main change brought is simply the imperative of good planning. Looking at 
2008 real vs. forecast differences, movements, passengers and opex differences 
add up to a 13,6€M loss. In 2009, opex alone had a 15,1€M difference, granted it 
was a gain, but it still reflects a serious planning flaw. These differences will no 
longer be able to just be incorporated in the following year’s tariffs and will be 
effective gains/losses for the company. Furthermore, besides the differences in 
itself being a risk, there is also a regulatory risk component in the sense that the 
regulator needs to believe in ANA’s planning and accept it (or not). So, here too 
would be interesting to understand if these differences are common and simply 
intrinsic to the sector, by the use of benchmark, or if others are consistently 
outperforming ANA in their planning and the company can actually do something 
about it, such as invest in R&D, HR and tools better equipped to forecast traffic, or 
hire specialized consultants.  
Moreover, the first element of the adjusted component on the formula brought in 
two huge risks: by using the regulated asset base (RAB) it introduced investment 
risk since any unplanned investments, or projects costing more than planned, will 
not be remunerated within the regulatory period, not to mention the regulatory 
risk component, whereby the regulator may never acknowledge these 
investments; and by the use of the pre-tax WACC as rate of return on RAB, it 
introduces the risk of the regulator setting a pre-tax WACC lower than the one 
actually realized in the 5 years of the regulatory period.  
Again here, there is an argument to be made for good planning and credibility, but 
there is a step further to be taken. There should be a risk management approach to 
a large investment from the very beginning, starting at the initial plan. When the 
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budget is estimated it should already account for risk. The risk of excavating and 
finding some material that is much harder to break, the risk of some red tape detail 
delay some part of the project for a couple months, etc., are risks that can perfectly 
be incorporated in the initial plan, using empirical probabilities that people in the 
field have a good sense of, thus coming to an expected value of what will be the 
cost of the project, as opposed to the current figure, providing an estimate for the 
case where everything goes as planned. As is, it makes little sense to use a 
triangular probability to compute probable maximum costs and lengths; it most 
certainly will never be less than the best case scenario, and the budget will be 
consistently overrun, affecting ANA’s credibility, reputation, and with the new 
regulatory model, its pockets, at the very least within the regulatory periods. 
Future Challenges 
With the new regulatory model stopping ANA to pass-through most of its risk to its 
consumers, it forces the company to rethink risk and the best approach to deal 
with it. The introduction of a new and improved ERM model was in fact an 
important step, but the company could incorporate this model as a great source of 
critical information and learn how to use it strategically. Knowing the value of 
Easyjet at Faro, allows the company to grasp a ceiling for the incentives to give this 
airline to remain there; knowing the impact of the TGV, gives an opportunity for 
the company to decide how to tackle this new competition: is it worthwhile to 
invest in incentives for TAP or promote a low cost route? A good planning, along 
with a clear understanding of its risks, may allow the company to discuss some fair 
risk premiums to be incorporated in the Price Cap formula; for instance, the 
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expected value of clients credit default in a regulatory period (by analyzing 
historical data and maybe considering macroeconomic conditions).  
For all this to work it needs to make sense within the organization, risk needs to be 
taken seriously across the company as whole. To that purpose, focus should be put 
on actually implementing the seemingly well designed communication plan. 
Furthermore, communication lines between the RMO and all divisions should be 
open and flexible and these divisions should have access to risk management 
information concerning them. For example, it would be interesting to show DPCG 
(the planning and management control division) the real vs. forecasts differences. 
People are more likely to incorporate risk when presented with a 13,6€M reality 
check, than with a theoretical display of the concept. 
 
